

We also face a major issue in trying to reach a decision on rebuilding Lock and Dam 26 at Alton, Illinois, on the Mississippi. If these structures give way, we will place a heavy strain on our rail and road facilities. And our farmers will pay a heavy price because we have been unable to reach a decision on how to proceed.

This issue brings together the concerns of the environmentalists, and those who feel that these facilities must be rebuilt.

We need to find a way to give these concerns a full hearing, but also be able to reach a conclusion promptly.

What is needed today is the development of a balanced food and agricultural policy which takes into account the needs and interests of farmers and consumers alike. This policy must relate our domestic, export and humanitarian concerns.

We will need to avoid dealing with problems on an ad hoc basis—groping from crisis to crisis, unsure of where we are headed but still proclaiming the gospel of the full market.

This will mean being realistic rather than being guided by polls, developing slogans, or coming up with new "WIN" buttons.

We should develop a policy aimed at the following specific objectives:

Price and income protection for producers of food and fiber;

Food supply stability for consumers at reasonable prices;

Adequate supplies of inputs and transportation for producers at reasonable prices; Assuring the production of adequate supplies of dairy and livestock products for domestic and international needs; and

The establishment of a reserve program to provide market stability during periods of shortage and surplus, maintain the reliability of the U.S. as an exporter, and continue the provision of food assistance to needy nations.

All of this can be done without depressing farm prices.

We have seen some of the problems of recent years from rising food prices, embargoes, rising farm indebtedness and foreclosures, and volatile export markets, to the cost price squeeze on farmers, particularly livestock and dairy producers.

We must get away from the uncertainty each year as to whether this will be a bad year for our livestock or grain producers.

The task before us requires leadership, getting on with the job ahead. Unfortunately, that commodity seems to be in short supply these days.

I pledge to continue my best efforts in this direction, and I urge you to do likewise.

U.S. INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, despite the tragic and bitter lessons we should have learned from our intervention in civil war in Southeast Asia, the Ford administration persists in deepening our involvement in the civil strife in Angola. This past week it was revealed that American aid has grown to the sum of \$50 million, and allegations that five American "spotter" planes, piloted by Americans, are being flown over Angola have not been denied. From statements made by the Secretary of State, it would appear that official intentions are to escalate rather than curtail American intervention in the weeks and months to come.

The war in Angola presents the first test of American foreign policy after Vietnam. Unfortunately, our performance to date indicates that we have not learned from our mistakes. Rather than

recognizing our limitations and carefully analyzing our interests, we are again plunging into a conflict in a far corner of the world as if we believed it was still our mission to serve as policeman of the world. The administration continues to base American foreign policy on an outmoded theory of balance of power among the superpowers and to view every internal conflict as a threat to that balance. What is worse, the course of action we are choosing offers no real benefits even if it succeeds.

Though the administration has portrayed the conflict in Angola as a product of the struggle between Soviet and Western ideologies, nothing could be further from the truth. The divisions within Angola are based on ethnic history and centuries of social stratification and colonial rule. They carry tribal and social overtones, and there is no evidence that any one faction can claim the broad based popular support to establish a legitimate claim to govern Angola. Indeed, from information now available it would appear that the FNLA, the movement supported by the United States, has the narrowest ethnic base of all the factions. Even if it should prevail in the near term, it is unlikely that it could control the long term course of events.

Further, in entering the Angolan conflict, we are allying ourselves with South Africa, the embodiment of racial repression.

Already 13 African nations, most recently Nigeria, have recognized the Soviet-backed Popular Movement, largely because they see a far greater danger in an Angola allied with South Africa than one friendly to the Soviet Union. It would be a Pyrrhic victory, indeed, if the United States were to successfully back a pro-American Angolan regime, and at the same time gain the enmity of a major portion of black Africa.

The United States should not condone or countenance the blatant intervention in Angola of the Soviet Union and Cuba. Once again the Soviets are demonstrating the limitations of détente and their adventurist behavior should be condemned in every available forum. It must be made perfectly clear to the U.S.S.R. and Cuba that they cannot expect to reap the benefits of more normal relations with the United States if they persist in such irresponsible conduct. We should make every effort to encourage the Organization of African Unity to curtail outside intervention and find peaceful solution to the Angolan problem.

Let us not, however, compound the tragedy and imitate Soviet policy. We should not expand and prolong the suffering of peoples on the other side of the world when American security is not at stake and when our actions have little chance for success and will jeopardize our relations with black Africa.

Congress should insist that the administration come forward and explain the extent of our involvement and exactly why it believes such involvement is necessary. We must demand much more than vague statements that transportation routes for oil would be endangered by a pro-Soviet Angolan Government. No

Angola until the issues are thoroughly debated and such expenditures are properly authorized by congressional action. There is still time to restore sanity and vision to American foreign policy if we act decisively in responding to the test which Angola has presented.

HUD FINANCES FLOOD PROJECTS

Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, tomorrow the Senate will consider my amendment to correct some of the worst inequities and excesses of the flood insurance program.

Over the many months I have been dealing with this program, I have been distressed by the calloused attitude of HUD administrators that people who have homes and businesses in areas subsequently designated to be a 100-year flood plain have only themselves to blame.

Forgetting for the moment that this country was settled on rivers, lakes, and ocean plains and that many of the individuals being victimized by this program built their homes decades before anyone thought of a Federal flood insurance program, I want to bring to the attention of Senators certain other mitigating circumstances that should weigh in their consideration of this issue.

First. Many of those who now find themselves in flood-disaster areas never had a problem until a Federal project—that is Corps of Engineers—was built upstream usually to give flood protection to an urban area. This has resulted in an aggravated flood problem downstream.

Second. Not until 1974 did the Federal Government act to require sellers of flood plain property to notify buyers of the hazard and consequences of buying in terms of loss of Federal construction and disaster aid.

Third. Perhaps most disturbing, a large number of these flood-plain structures were built or acquired with Federal assistance and the Federal agency had or should have had full knowledge of the hazard involved. Here is what GAO found in a limited survey of this situation in May, 1975—GAO Report No. RED-75-327:

HUD. "In January 1970 HUD approved a multi-family complex—subsequently constructed—in Texas for mortgage insurance of \$1.2 million. Although a Corps flood plain information report showed that part of the development was in the 100-year flood plain, HUD did not adequately evaluate this information. Based on information in the Corps' report . . . 3 of the 10 apartment buildings would have their floors covered by up to 2 feet of water in a 100-year flood."

HUD. "In another case, HUD gave preliminary approval in June 1973 for mortgage insurance totaling \$690,000 on a 60-unit multi-family project in Texas. The HUD appraiser certified that the project was not subject to flooding. We discussed this project with HUD officials, and they requested the Corps to provide technical information on the flood hazard. The information showed that a 100-year flood would cover the first floor of the units with up to 4 feet of water."

HUD. "GAO reviewed the files for 1 existing house and for disposal actions on 13 houses and found no evidence of flood hazard evaluation. HUD field officials said they did not evaluate the flood hazard on the disposal of these houses. They were unaware of any